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Religious diversity, encompassing three religious groups, i.e., Buddhists, Protestants, and Roman 
Catholics, in addition to a large number of non-religious people, has been overlooked in examining 
attitudes and behavior of South Koreans, even though religion can function as a major divisive line in 
a society largely lacking ethnic diversity until recently. Using a nationally representative survey, the 
present study shows the negative consequences of religiocentrism, measured by emotional distances 
from religious in-group to out-groups. Individuals who have high levels of religiocentrism are more 
likely to be prejudiced against members of other religious groups and immigrants, less likely to have 
permissive views on homosexuality and abortion, more likely to hold authoritarian positions regarding 
social issues, and less likely to trust others and vote. At the same time, people exhibiting religiocentrism 
tend to report higher levels of happiness. This study calls for institutional efforts to foster mutual 
understanding across different religious groups in order to accumulate social capital, even as doing so 
may negatively affect subjective well-being by undermining religious in-group solidarity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although it is quite well-known that South Korea is one of the most racially and 
ethnically homogeneous countries, its longstanding religious heterogeneity has received 
less attention. According to the 2005 Census (Kim, Lee, Son, & Smith, 2009), the Korean 
population consists of Buddhists (23%), Protestants (18%), Roman Catholics (11%), and 
those who are not affiliated with any religion (47%).1 Tension between religious groups 
obviously exists, but somewhat surprisingly, religion rarely serves as the main political 
division in South Korea. Presumably because the proportion of non-religious people is 
large, political elites do not have incentives to use religious appeals to mobilize voters, and 
therefore, religion-based tension seems to be confined to interpersonal relations and family 
life of ordinary citizens. 
However, occasionally, religious tension is activated in the political arena. For example, 
the former president of South Korea, Lee Myung-bak, unequivocally expressed his own 
religious beliefs (Protestantism) in public. As a mayor of the city of Seoul, before he was 
elected as the president, Lee Myung-bak said, “I declare that the City of Seoul is a holy place 
governed by Christian God; the citizens in Seoul are Christian God’s people; the churches 
and Christians in Seoul are spiritual guards that protect the city. […] I now dedicate Seoul 
to the Lord (Lee, 2008).” Also, in 2011, while attending a national prayer breakfast in 
March, President Lee knelt to pray at the urging of Protestant leaders (Hopfner, 2011). His 
1 The 2015 Census reports that 56% Koreans are not affiliated with any religion, while 20% of them 
are Protestants, 16% Buddhists, and 8% Catholics. It is not clear whether this result is comparable 
with those from previous surveys, because the 2015 Census is the first Census that employed 
Internet-based survey methods for a significant number of the respondents. 
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behavior drew complaints and protests from non-Protestant citizens, and was, in principle, 
unconstitutional, as South Korea’s Constitution clearly stipulates that there is no official 
religion and bars the country’s leaders from elevating one faith above others. These episodes 
clearly suggest that without ethnic and racial heterogeneity, religion has a potential to 
function as a main dividing line in Korean society. 
Though there have been prior studies that intend to explain the origins of South Korea’s 
religious diversity and its consequences (e.g., Kim, 2002; Kim, 2003; Jeong, 2010), most 
studies have paid attention to three conventional aspects of religion (Olson & Warber, 
2008), i.e., religious affiliation (belonging), religious attendance (behaving), and religiosity 
(believing). Attitudinal and behavioral differences across religions as a socio-demographic 
factor are relatively well-reported, but little is known about the roles of the underlying, 
psychological factor—perhaps except for that of the degree of religious belief, i.e., 
religiosity—such as emotional distances from religious in-group to out-groups in formulating 
opinions on social and political issues. By focusing religiocentrism, a concept that reflects 
an individual’s innate religious tension in a more effective way than other religion-related 
concepts, the present study examines the ways many dimensions of public opinion have been 
influenced by religion. Following the ethnocentrism arguments by Kinder and Kam (2009), 
this study shows that, in an environment lacking ethnic and racial division, subjectively 
perceived differences based on religion is associated with a variety of opinions, including, 
but not limited to, attitudes toward social issues such as immigration, homosexuality and 
abortion, conformity to the authority, and even social capital, particularly generalized trust 
and voting. 
2. RELIGIOCENTRISM AS A DETERMINANT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Religiocentrism is defined as the combination of positive attitudes toward religious in-
group and negative attitudes toward religious out-groups (Sterkens & Anthony, 2008). Such 
a definition is rooted in a more well-studied concept, ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is a term 
for individuals’ innate predisposition in which one’s own group is the center of everything 
and all others are evaluated with reference to it. One’s own group is considered superior, at 
the same time groups with which one does not feel affiliated being regarded inferior. Simply 
put, ethnocentrism is individuals’ tendency—which prevails in all the societies around the 
world—to categorize the human being into in-groups and out-groups. Kinder and Kam (2009) 
examine ethnocentrism from four distinct theoretical perspectives: ethnocentrism as an 
expression of social identity, as a consequence of realistic group conflict, as an outgrowth of 
the authoritarian personality, and as an outcome of natural selection.
Social identity theory begins with an assumption that individuals are motivated to 
maintain or enhance their self-esteem. Individuals tend to derive their sense of self from their 
membership in reference groups. The sense of belonging to a specific social group becomes 
one’s identity, reflecting where and how individuals locate themselves in the society as a 
whole. Identity derives from the process of social categorization, which parses the social 
world into a manageable set of basic categories (Tajfel, 1981). Individuals overestimate 
similarities between themselves and their in-group, and accentuate differences between 
themselves and their various out-groups (Huddy, 2001). In this regard, ethnocentrism is a 
by-product of the process of identity formation, and therefore it will not disappear unless 
one is completely disconnected from his or her reference group. Related, yet somewhat 
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being different from social identity theory, realistic group conflict theory further argues that 
ethnocentrism includes both in-group solidarity and out-group hostility, which come from 
intergroup competition over scarce resources or political power (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). 
Simply put, realistic group conflict theory suggests that ethnocentrism involves antagonism 
between groups rooted in actual conflict, which is not a necessary condition in social identity 
theory.
Authoritarianism is a psychological mechanism that consolidates group identity. 
Originally designed to study the causes of anti-Semitism, students of authoritarianism are 
interested in the evolution of a particular animosity into a general predisposition. People high 
on authoritarianism measures choose social cohesion over individual autonomy (Stenner, 
2005). As authoritarians glorify, encourage, and reward uniformity, authoritarianism is known 
to be a consistent and powerful predictor of political intolerance, discriminating against any 
groups who they believe do not conform to the status quo. As a defense mechanism with 
which to maintain one’s identity and justify the society, authoritarianism is inextricably linked 
with evolutionary processes, which reflect the profoundly social nature of human beings as a 
species. According to this argument, ethnocentrism is part of fundamental survival strategy 
that encourages obligatory interdependence and altruism among in-group members (Kurzban, 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). 
In sum, ethnocentrism can be understood as a predisposition produced during the process 
of social categorization between in-group and out-groups, where actual competition over 
resources and political power may be involved (realistic group conflict theory) or not (social 
identity theory). The origins of ethnocentrism can be found in evolutionary processes, and it 
tends to be reinforced by projecting authoritarian attitudes to the social world. Consequently, 
as Kinder and Kam (2009) report, one can observe the impact of ethnocentrism on 
individuals’ attitudes toward a myriad of issues such as the war on terrorism, humanitarian 
assistance, immigration, same-sex marriage, and the welfare state, and therefore it is safe to 
say that ethnocentrism is a main driving force of public opinion in the United States. 
In theory, religiocentrism is a type of ethnocentrism, since some people utilize religious 
group as a reference group that divides “us” from “them”. However, religiocentrism is 
significantly different from ethnocentrism, mainly because the former is based on a reference 
group that one can relatively easily change, i.e., religion, while the latter is deeply rooted in 
another reference group, which is not readily malleable, e.g., ethnicity, race, or nationality. 
The possibility that one can convert one religion from another during the life cycle 
undoubtedly makes it less interesting to employ religion as a core element of ethnocentrism. 
Moreover, religious divisions are usually overlapped with other divisions based on ethnicity, 
race, and nationality (e.g., Bosnians vs. Serbians in former Yugoslavia, Igbo vs. Yoruba in 
Nigeria, Uyghurs vs. Chinese in China, to name a few). Given that ethnic, racial, and national 
groups are more salient in politics than religious ones (Mitchell, 2006), it is understandable 
that little has been studied on the impact of religiocentrism on individuals’ attitudes and 
behaviors. Thanks to its ethnic and racial homogeneity, however, South Korea offers a unique 
opportunity to examine the effects of religiocentrism, disentangled from other related types 
of in-group favoritism, on public opinion and behavior.
There are a myriad of previous studies reporting that religious factors tend to determine 
attitudes toward broader social issues. For example, religiosity is known to be influential in 
determining racial prejudice. Brandt and Reyna (2014) show that religious fundamentalists 
show higher levels of symbolic racism against African-Americans, though not necessarily 
being emotionally “cold” toward them. Also, religious particularism—belief that there is only 
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one true religion—is correlated with religious and racial prejudice, while doctrinal belief that 
there is a “personal” God or individual spirituality—how strongly one is interested in the 
sacred or the supernatural—is not (Ekici & Yucel, 2015). In a similar vein, there is a report 
that religiosity is positively associated with authoritarianism (Canetti-Nisim, 2004). The 
effect of religiosity is far-reaching to cover trust and civic engagement (McAndrew & Voas, 
2014), life satisfaction (Lim & Putnam, 2010), and opinions on climate change. America 
evangelicals tend to oppose climate policy due to their distrust of international cooperation 
and institutions (Chaudoin, Smith, & Urpelainen, 2014). Religious affiliation seems to matter 
as well: according to a cross-cultural study, Buddhists and Taoists exhibit high interreligious 
tolerance and weaker or no anti-gay prejudice (Clobert, Saroglou, Hwang, & Soong, 2014). 
Religious participation is also reported to be associated with prejudice with regard to any 
given target group (Burch-Brown & Baker, 2016).
In South Korea, many attempts have been made to clarify the relationship between 
religion and public attitudes. Buddhists have generally lower levels of educational attainment, 
occupy lower economic class, and hold more conservative political views than Protestants 
or Catholics (Kim, 2002). Christianity is known to increase individuals’ civic engagement, 
while Buddhism does not have an impact on it (Jeong, 2010). However, another study tells 
us a somewhat different story that among people whose age is over 65, both Buddhists and 
Catholics are more active in volunteering than Protestants or those who are not affiliated with 
religion (Kim, Kang, Lee, & Lee, 2007). Though informative, these studies all focus on three 
conventional aspects of religion (Olson & Warber, 2008), i.e., religious affiliation (belonging), 
religious attendance (behaving), and religiosity (believing). None of these studies looked at 
the roles of religiocentrism seriously, and therefore failed to see how individuals incorporate 
their innate religious tension vis-à-vis religious out-groups in their opinion formation. 
This study aims at offering empirical evidence in support of the fungibility of in-group 
favoritism (or, to be specific, religiocentrism), i.e., the possibility that a very strong in-group 
favoritism on one dimension applies to another dimension. According to the fungibility 
argument, not only are people high on religiocentrism more like to harbor negative attitudes 
toward other religious groups, but also do they demonstrate opposition to other, non-religious, 
out-groups, particularly social minorities. To be specific, people high on religiocentrism are 
expected to hold negative attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities (e.g., immigrants) and 
sexual minorities (e.g., homosexuals). It cannot be overstated that the fungibility argument 
does not assume any causal direction. The argument says that one’s belief in the superiority 
of one’s religion over others is associated with hostility against other non-religious out-
groups. That said, in theory, it is impossible to know whether religiocentrism leads to in-
group favoritism in terms of race, ethnicity, nation, and sexual orientation or whether strong 
attachment to one’s ethnicity or sexual identity yields religiocentrism. However, in practice, 
lack of ethnic and racial diversity makes it less likely that religiocentrism is a by-product of 
another type of in-group favoritism. 
Religiocentrism also means strong commitment to religious doctrines of one’s own 
religion. And therefore, it may be linked with higher levels of conformity to the authority. As 
in-group favoritism indicates closed-mindedness (Kruglanski, 2004), the embeddedness in 
a reference group will hinder broader exposure to the society, and therefore will undermine 
civic engagement and the accumulation of social capital. However, paradoxically, a strong 
sense of belonging to one’s own religion is likely to be associated with higher levels 
of subjective well-being, as prior studies on group attachment and happiness suggests 
(Morrison, Tay, & Diener, 2011). The present study offers evidence in support of the image of 
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religiocentric individuals, who “hunker down”, avoiding exposure to the larger community, 
while personally being satisfied with their life conditions. 
3. DATA AND MEASURES
Statistical analysis is based on the 2008 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), a 
nationally representative survey applying the sampling procedure and interviewing methods 
of the General Social Survey (GSS) of the United States (Kim et al. 2019). The KGSS is 
composed of a number of core questions, which are generally compatible with those of the 
GSS, a survey year specific module shared with the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP), and its own unique, additional questions. The key independent variables used in 
this study are part of the 2008 ISSP module. The total number of respondents in the 2008 
KGSS is 1,507. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, a small number of respondents (n = 
26) affiliated with minor religious groups such as Confucianism, Won Buddhism, and Taoism 
have been excluded. The sample is limited to four major groups: Buddhists (n = 357; 24.1%), 
Protestants (n = 391; 26.4%), Catholics (n = 135; 9.1%), and Atheists or No Religion (n = 
598; 40.4%).
3.1. Dependent Variables
Five sets of the dependent variables are employed in statistical analysis. The first set is 
about individual’s attitudes toward members of other religious groups, measured by asking 
whether respondents are willing to accept a member of other religious group as the spouse 
of their relatives (1 = Support; 4 = Oppose; M = 1.95, SD = 0.93) and whether respondents 
are willing to accept a member of other religious group as a candidate for their preferred 
political party (1 = Support; 4 = Oppose; M = 1.81, SD = 0.82). The second set asks about the 
respondent’s attitudes toward homosexuality (1 = Support; 4 = Oppose, M = 1.50, SD = 0.91) 
and abortion due to financial hardship (1 = Support; 4 = Oppose, M = 2.46, SD = 1.12). The 
third set of the dependent variables is about the respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants, 
i.e., foreign workers (1 = Accept More; 5 = Do Not Accept, M = 3.40, SD = 0.99) and foreign 
brides (1 = Accept More; 5 = Do Not Accept, M = 3.34, SD = 0.98). The fourth set taps the 
levels of conformity to the authority, asking whether one should respect the father’s authority 
(1 = Never; 7 = Always, M = 2.55, SD = 1.37) and whether one should obey orders from the 
supervisor even if they are in conflict with one’s ideas (1 = Never, 7 = Always, M = 3.94, 
SD = 1.55). The last set of questions is about generalized trust (1 = Never Trust, 4 = Always 
Trust, M = 2.33, SD = 0.71) and self-reported voting in the 2007 presidential election (78% 
of the respondents reported to have voted). 
As one can easily imagine, the first set of the dependent variables directly reflects 
the nature of religiocentrism, whereas the rest of them do not seem to be determined by 
relative strength of religious in-group favoritism. The second set of the variables offer an 
opportunity to see the effects of religiocentrism on opinions on religion-related issues such 
as homosexuality and abortion, the third set allows us to test the fungibility hypothesis 
suggesting in-group favoritism in terms of religion can yield another in-group favoritism 
in other dimensions (e.g., immigration), the fourth set explores the relationship between 
religiocentrism and conformity to the non-religious authority, and the fifth set examines 
whether religiocentrism and attitudes and behaviors regarding social capital are mutually 
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associated. 
3.2. Independent Variables
In order to measure the main independent variable, religiocentrism, Kinder and Kam’s 
(2009) strategy regarding ethnocentrism has been employed. The KGSS does not contain 
feeling thermometer questions on religious groups. Instead, a set of questions asking 
respondents’ subjective evaluations of each religious group are available. They are five-point 
scale questions, higher values indicating positive attitudes toward a given religious group. 
Using these questions, religiocentrism is calculated as follows:
Religiocentrism 
= ∑ (subjective evaluation of R’s own religion) – (subjective evaluation of other religious 
groups). 
For example, the religiocentrism score of a Roman Catholic respondent is a simple sum of 
perceived distances between Catholicism and three other religious groups (i.e., Catholicism 
vs. Buddhism, Catholicism vs. Protestantism, and Catholicism vs. Atheists or No Religion). 
Religiocentrism ranges from -4 to +4, positive values indicating in-group favoritism, zero 
denoting no attitudinal differences between in-group and out-groups, and negative values 
indicating out-group favoritism. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of religiocentrism. As expected, all four 
religious groups demonstrate in-group favoritism, but its degree is noticeably smaller in the 
case of Atheists or No Religion (M = 0.13, SD = 0.78) than three religious groups (Buddhists: 
M = 0.83, SD = 0.69; Protestants: M = 0.96, SD = 0.88; and Catholics: M = 0.94, SD = 0.64). 
Religiocentrism by religious groups offers some interesting information. Members of three 
religious groups demonstrate in-group favoritism vis-à-vis other religions, but those not 
affiliated with any religious groups hold relatively negative attitudes toward Protestants (M 
= 0.61, SD = 1.30), while holding relatively positive attitudes toward Catholics (M = -0.03, 
SD = 1.13) and Buddhists (M = -0.05, SD = 1.06). However, none of these group differences 
turn out to be statistically significant, and therefore one cannot conclude that Protestants are 















Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Buddhist 0.83 0.69 1.48 1.22 0.80 1.04 0 0 1.04 1.06
Protestant 0.96 0.88 0 0 0.80 1.22 1.47 1.43 1.56 1.38
Catholic 0.94 0.64 1.53 1.22 0 0 0.80 0.90 1.44 1.11
No Religion 0.13 0.78 0.61 1.30 -0.03 1.13 -0.05 1.06 0 0
Note:  The religiocentrism variable ranges from -4 to +4. Positive values indicate religious in-group 
favoritism, while negative values denote religious out-group favoritism. Zero indicate the non-existence 
of religiocentrism (n= 1,481).
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the least favored religious group in South Korea. Nor is it true to say that religiocentrism 
is significantly stronger among Protestants than other religious groups despite the fact that 
evangelicalism is dominant in South Korean Protestantism (Lee, 2010; Ryu, 2008). Table 1 
shows that group differences in terms of religiocentrism are much subtler than expected. 
In order to see what determines religiocentrism, a regression analysis has been 
performed (not reported here). In the model, reliogiocentrism is regressed on three religion-
related variables, i.e., religiosity, religious attendance, and religious affiliation (Buddhists, 
Protestants, and Catholics with No Religion as a reference category), after controlling for a 
variety of socio-demographic variables such as age, income, gender, education, employment 
status, marital status, and fifteen province-level dummies. None of the control variables 
turn out to be statistically significant, but, as expected, religion-related variables are good 
predictors of religiocentrism: religiosity (b = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p = 0.02), religious attendance (b 
= 0.08, SE = 0.01, p < 0.01), Buddhists (b = 0.43, SE = 0.06, p < 0.01), Protestants (b = 0.37, 
SE = 0.07, p < 0.01), and Catholics (b = 0.45, SE = 0.07, p < 0.01). This finding suggests that, 
albeit conceptually and operationally different from each other, religiocentrism is a function 
of well-studied concepts related to religion.
3.3. Covariates
An array of control variables is included in the statistical models: age, gender, monthly 
household income, education, political ideology, financial satisfaction, employment status 
(currently working, student, homemaker, retired, and unemployed) and marital status (married, 
widowed, separate/divorced, and never married). In addition to these control variables, the 
models also include three variables related to religion, religious affiliation (with “Atheists or 
No Religion” as a reference category), self-reported religiosity, and religious attendance. If 
the effects of the main independent variable, religiocentrism, on the dependent variables are 
significant, even controlling for three well-known dimensions of religion (i.e., religiosity, 
religious attendance, and religious affiliation), then the results clearly demonstrate the added 
values of religiocentrism as a determinant of public opinion and suggest that many previous 
studies on religion and individuals’ attitudes and behaviors suffer from a serious omitted 
variable bias. 
3.4. Analytic Strategies
Since all the dependent variables used in this study are ordinal variables with 4–, 5–, or 7–
point scales, ordered probit has been employed as an estimation method. The province-level 
fixed effects are considered to eliminate the possibility that the results are the products of 
correlations between religiocentrism and some unobserved contextual factors (e.g., province-
level cultural differences) that might affect the dependent variables. The results also report 
robust standard errors clustered at the province level to allow for the interdependence of 
survey respondents in a given province. Since the unstandardized coefficients from ordered 
probit are not intuitively interpretable, the predicted probabilities are calculated, following 
Long (1997). 
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4. RESULTS
Table 2 demonstrates the results regarding the effects of religiocentrism on attitudes 
toward members of other religious groups. Consistent with our expectation, religiocentrism 
turns out to be associated with negative attitudes toward other religious groups. People high 
on religiocentrism are less willing to accept members of other religious groups as spouses of 
their relatives (b = 0.19, SE = 0.05, p < 0.01) and also do not like the idea of having members 
of other religious groups as candidate for their preferred political party (b = 0.12, SE = 0.05, 
p < 0.05). These findings hold even after controlling for a few religion-related factors such 
as religiosity, religious attendance, and religious affiliation, some of which yield statistically 
significant finding. For example, other things being equal, Catholics are likely to harbor 
lower levels of prejudice against other religions (b = -0.56, SE = 0.15, p < 0.01 for Model 1 
and b = -0.49, SE = 0.17, p < 0.01 for Model 2).    
Table 2. Religiocentrism and Attitudes toward Members of Other Religions
Marry with R’s Relatives
(1=Support; 4=Oppose)
Become a Candidate for R’s Preferred 
Political Party(1=Support; 4=Oppose)





























Note:  Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors at the level of 
province from ordered probit; cut points are not reported; the reference category for religious 
affiliation is “No Religion”; age, gender, income, education, political ideology, financial 
satisfaction, employment status, marital status are included as controls, but are not reported here; 
fixed effects at the level of province are applied. The predicted probabilities (min-max changes) 
indicate the probability of choosing a value (“strongly support”) of the dependent variables, when 
each independent variable moves from its minimum value to its maximum value. 
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
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The effect sizes of religion-related variables are calculated, following the procedures 
delineated by Long (1997). With other variables fixed at their mean values, an increase 
in religiocentrism from its minimum to its maximum values (min-max change) correlates 
with a 37%-point decrease in a respondent’s likelihood of strongly supporting the marriage 
between member of other religious groups and his or her relatives. An equivalent increase in 
religiocentrism corresponds to a 23%-point decrease in the likelihood of strongly supporting 
members of other religions as a candidate for the respondent’s preferred political party. These 
effect sizes are also substantially large: for example, the equivalent magnitude of the effect 
of religious attendance (from its minimum, “never”, to its maximum, “more than once per 
week”), another statistically significant variable in Model 1, is a negative 18%-point. These 
results indicate that the effects of religiocentrism on prejudice against other religions are 
greater than other religion-related variables, despite the fact that, as potential determinants 
of religiocentrism, they overshadow the direct effects of religiocentrism on the dependent 
Table 3. Religocentrism and Opinions on Homosexuality and Abortion
Homosexuality
(1=Oppose; 4=Support)
Abortion due to Financial Hardship
(1=Oppose; 4=Support)





























Note:  Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors at the level of 
province from ordered probit; cut points are not reported; the reference category for religious 
affiliation is “No Religion”; age, gender, income, education, political ideology, financial 
satisfaction, employment status, marital status are included as controls, but are not reported here; 
fixed effects at the level of province are applied. The predicted probabilities (min-max changes) 
indicate the probability of choosing a value (“strongly oppose”) of the dependent variables, when 
each independent variable moves from its minimum value to its maximum value.
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
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variables.
Table 3 demonstrates the results regarding the effects of religiocentrism on attitudes 
toward two social issues, i.e., homosexuality and abortion due to financial hardship. 
Consistent with our expectation, religiocentrism turns out to be associated with negative 
attitudes toward homosexuality (b = -0.19, SE = 0.04, p < 0.01) and abortion (b = -0.06, 
SE = 0.03, p < 0.05). None of other religion-related variables exert influence on attitudes 
toward homosexuality, while people who regularly attend church or temple are less likely to 
support abortion due to financial hardship. Also, compared with people unaffiliated with a 
religion, Buddhists and Catholics are more likely to support abortion. With other variables 
fixed at their mean values, an increase in religiocentrism from its minimum to its maximum 
values correlates with a 33%-point increase in a respondent’s likelihood of strongly opposing 
homosexuality. An equivalent increase in religiocentrism corresponds to a 11%-point increase 
in the likelihood of strongly opposing abortion due to financial hardship, which is slightly 
smaller of the effect of religious attendance (17%-point). These findings suggest that, at least 
in the case of attitudes toward homosexuality, religiocentrism has been an important, omitted 
variable. 
Table 4 demonstrates the results regarding the effects of religiocentrism on attitudes 
toward immigrants. Consistent with our expectation, religiocentrism turns out to be 
associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants. People high on religiocentrism believe 
that it is necessary to reduce the number of foreign workers (b = 0.08, SE = 0.04, p < 0.05) 
and brides from other countries (b = 0.10, SE = 0.04, p < 0.05). Similar to the previous set 
of results, these findings hold even after controlling for a few religion-related factors such 
as religiosity, religious attendance, and religious affiliation. With other variables fixed at 
their mean values, an increase in religiocentrism from its minimum to its maximum values 
correlates with a 9%-point increased in a respondent’s likelihood of believing that the number 
of foreign workers need to be decrease a little. An equivalent increase in religiocentrism 
corresponds to a 12%-point increase in the likelihood of reporting that the number of foreign 
brides need to be decreased a little.
Religiocentrism also turns out to be positively associated with conformity to the non-
religious authority (Table 5). People high on religiocentrism are more likely to believe that 
it is desirable to always respect fathers’ authority (b = 0.08, SE = 0.04, p < 0.05) and to obey 
orders from the supervisor even if these orders are at odds of their own ideas (b = 0.14, SE = 
0.05, p < 0.05). With other variables fixed at their mean values, an increase in religiocentrism 
from its minimum to its maximum values correlates with a 14%-point increase in a 
respondent’s strong belief that the authority of the father must be respected. An equivalent 
increase in religiocentrism corresponds to a 10%-point increase in strong belief that one must 
obey orders from the supervisor.
Table 6 demonstrates the relationship between religiocentrism and elements of social 
capital, i.e., generalized trust and voting. Religiocentrism is negatively associated with 
generalized trust (b = -0.11, SE = 0.05, p < 0.05), and it is also negatively associated with 
self-reported voter turnout (b = -0.10, SE = 0.05, p < 0.05). With other variables fixed at 
their mean values, an increase in religiocentrism from its minimum to its maximum values 
correlates with a 17%-point decrease in a respondent’s likelihood of reporting a moderate 
level of trust (“I somewhat trust people”), while it corresponds to a 13%-point decrease in 
self-reported voting. 
In order to see whether the relationship between religiocentrism and the dependent 
variables varies across religious groups, a set of additional analysis have been performed 
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Note:  Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors at the level of 
province from ordered probit; cut points are not reported; the reference category for religious 
affiliation is “No Religion”; age, gender, income, education, political ideology, financial 
satisfaction, employment status, marital status are included as controls, but are not reported here; 
fixed effects at the level of province are applied. The predicted probabilities (min-max changes) 
indicate the probability of choosing a value (“need to reduce the number of immigrants a little”) 
of the dependent variables, when each independent variable moves from its minimum value to its 
maximum value.
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
by adding interaction terms between religiocentrism and three religious groups (Buddhist, 
Protestant, and Catholic, with No Religion as a reference category) in the models (not 
reported here). It turns out that religiocentrism affects attitudes toward other religious groups 
differently, depending on the respondent’s religious affiliation. As shown in Table 2, people 
high on religiocentrism are less likely to accept a member of other religious group as their 
relatives’ spouse, and such as relationship tends to be larger among Protestants (p < 0.01 
for religiocentrism x Protestant). Likewise, the tendency of rejecting a member of another 
religious group as a candidate of one’s preferred political party increases for Protestants (p < 
0.01 for religiocentrism x Protestant) and Catholics (p < 0.01 for religiocentrism x Catholic). 
However, none of these interaction terms turn out to be statistically significant, when other 
dependent variables are under scrutiny. It suggests that the effects of religiocentrism on 
attitudes toward social issues, other out-groups, non-religious authority, and social capital are 
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not moderated by religious affiliation. 
To be specific, the lack of statistical significance of the interaction terms between 
Protestant and religiocentrism in the case of attitudes toward immigration allow us to exclude 
the possibility that South Korean Protestants react to immigrants based on their religious 
affiliation. If Protestants (or Christians, in general) considered current immigrants—mostly 
Korean-Chinese, as well as those from Southeast Asia—as a distinct religious group, the 
above-mentioned interaction terms should have been significant. Likewise, the fact that 
interaction terms between religiocentrism and religious affiliation failed to yield significant 
results in predicting attitudes toward homosexuality and abortion suggests that opinions on 
these issues are not group-specific. 
Another analysis has been performed to see whether religiocentrism is associated with 
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Note:  Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors at the level of 
province from ordered probit; the reference category for religious affiliation is “No Religion”; cut 
points are not reported; age, gender, income, education, political ideology, financial satisfaction, 
employment status, marital status are included as controls, but are not reported here; fixed effects 
at the level of province are applied. The predicted probabilities (min-max changes) indicate the 
probability of choosing a value (“strongly support” for Model 1 and “somewhat support” for 
Model 2) of the dependent variables, when each independent variable moves from its minimum 
value to its maximum value.
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
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Note:  Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors at the level of 
province from ordered probit (Model 1) and probit (Model 2); cut points are not reported; the 
reference category for religious affiliation is “No Religion”; age, gender, income, education, 
political ideology, financial satisfaction, employment status, marital status are included as 
controls, but are not reported here; fixed effects at the level of province are applied. The predicted 
probabilities (min-max changes) indicate the probability of choosing a value (“trust somewhat” 
for Model 1 and “voted” for Model 2) of the dependent variables, when each independent 
variable moves from its minimum value to its maximum value.
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (two-tailed)
self-reported level of life satisfaction (not reported here). The dependent variable is based 
on a 4–point scale survey question asking whether the respondents feel happy these days. As 
this dependent variable is quite different from others used in above-mentioned analysis in 
terms of its nature, the control variable included the model (ordered probit) are not identical. 
The model includes well-known predictors of happiness: age and its squared term to see a 
curvilinear relationship between age and happiness (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2008), gender, 
education (Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008), income (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002), 
marital status (Myers, 1999), employment status (Lelkes, 2006), trust (Helliwell, 2003), 
financial satisfaction (Johnson & Krueger, 2006), political ideology (Napier & Jost, 2008), 
political participation (Stutzer & Frey, 2006), and religious attendance (Lim & Putnam, 
2010). Analysis shows that people high on religiocentrism turn out to be happier (b = 0.11, 
SE = 0.06, p < 0.05), which suggest group solidarity fostered by religious in-group favoritism 
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offers life satisfaction. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
According to the findings of this study, individuals high on religiocentrism are prejudiced 
against other religious groups, have conservative opinions on social issues such as 
homosexuality and abortion, hold negative attitudes toward immigrants, are authoritarian, 
are less likely to trust others, and less likely to vote in South Korea. Given that South Korea 
is largely an ethnically and racially homogeneous country, the effects of religiocentrism on 
individuals’ attitudes and behavior are free from confounding factors based on other group 
identities. Moreover, all these results are obtained after controlling for religion-related 
variables (religiosity, religious attendance, and religious affiliation), and therefore, one can 
realize how misleading the previous studies on religion and political behavior has been. It 
is relatively easy to understand that religiocentrism, i.e., religious in-group favoritism, is 
negatively associated with attitudes toward other religious group members. Also, it is by and 
large consistent with our intuition to see the negative association between religiocentrism and 
social issues (e.g., homosexuality and abortion) because they have not been compatible with 
religious beliefs. 
However, the linkage between religiocentrism and attitudes toward non-religious out-
groups needs more explanations. One possible way in which one can interpret such a finding 
is to pay attention to the fungibility of prejudice against out-groups. Religiocentrism leads 
to antagonism against religious out-groups, which, in turn, yields another set of prejudice 
against non-religious out-groups who are usually marginalized from the mainstream society 
(e.g., immigrants). Furthermore, the belief that one’s own group is superior to other groups 
dovetails with higher levels of conformity to the authority. Ultimately, strong in-group 
favoritism hinders individuals from accumulating social capital, by undermining trust and 
discouraging voter turnout. These negative consequences notwithstanding, individuals high 
on religiocentrism report higher levels of happiness. 
This study contributes to our understanding of religious in-group favoritism and its 
far-reaching consequences in individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. Taking advantage of 
a unique situation of South Korea, i.e., a high level of racial and ethnic homogeneity 
with religious diversity, this study reveals that the effects of religiocentrism have been 
underestimated in explaining political behavior of ordinary citizens. In order to minimize 
the negative consequences of religiocentrism, it seems necessary to make institutional 
efforts for promoting mutual understanding across religious groups. By doing so, one can 
reduce prejudice against minority groups, make people less authoritarian, and facilitate civic 
engagement to enhance social capital, but it may harm one’s subjective well-being. Further 
empirical research needs to be considered to resolve such a dilemma. 
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